"The Relationship of Economic Theory to Experiments" [02/03/09]
"Self Control, Risk Aversion, and the Allais Paradox" [01/24/09] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'" [10/26/08] (with D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin)
"Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis" [08/03/08] (with D. Fudenberg)
"A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays" [12/13/07] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Repeated Games with Frequent Signals" [12/13/07] (with D. Fudenberg)
"The Slippery Slope of Concession" [12/05/07] (with J. Hirshleifer and M. Boldrin)
"Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique" [04/05/07] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Policy Platforms, Campaign Spending and Voter Participation" [03/17/07] (with H. Herrera and C. Martinelli)
"Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring" [02/02/07] (with D. Fudenberg)
"The Brother in Law Effect" [10/23/06] (with F. Weinschelbaum and F. Zurita)
"An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning" [10/05/06] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Deterrence in the Cold War and the War on Terror" [03/28/06] (with R. Levine)
"Can A Turing Player Identify Itself?" [01/29/06] (with B. Szentes)
"Quantum Games Have No News For Economics" [12/04/05]
"Auctions and Relationships" [09/28/05]
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The Paradox of Voter Participation: A Laboratory Study" [09/13/05] (with T. Palfrey)
"A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control" [07/28/05] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Superstition and Rational Learning" [07/16/05] (with D. Fudenberg)
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When is Reputation Bad" [04/08/05] (with J. Ely and D. Fudenberg)
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Evolution of Cooperation Through Imitation" [03/25/05] (with W. Pesendorfer)
"Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient" [09/26/04] (with D. Fudenberg and S. Takahashi)
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The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games" [06/04/04] (with D. Fudenberg)
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Learning to Play Bayesian Games" [07/21/02] (with E. Dekel and D. Fudenberg)
"Game Theory" [06/19/01]
"Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction" [06/16/01] (with E. Dekel and D. Fudenberg)
"Introduction: The Dynamic Games Special Issue" [09/08/00] (with A. Rustichini)
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Evolution and Information in a Gift Giving Game" [06/04/00] (with P. Johnson and W. Pesendorfer)
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Evolution Through Imitation in a Single Population" [05/09/00] (with W. Pesendorfer)
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The Castle on the Hill" [01/04/00]
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Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium" [01/24/99] (with E. Dekel and D. Fudenberg)
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Learning in the Stock Flow Model" [12/29/97]
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Modeling Altruism and Spitefulness in Experiments" [10/17/97]
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Reputation with Noisy Precommitment" [08/13/97] (with C. Martinelli)
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Conditional Universal Consistency" [08/13/97] (with D. Fudenberg)
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Reputation and Distribution in a Gift Giving Game" [12/07/96]
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Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games" [12/07/96] (with D. Fudenberg)
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An Easier Way to Calibrate" [12/07/96] (with D. Fudenberg)
The Theory of Learning in Games [12/03/96] (with D. Fudenberg)
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Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play" [10/29/96] (with D. Fudenberg)
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Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent" [10/29/96] (with M. Celentani, D. Fudenberg and W. Pesendorfer)
"Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players" [01/01/94] (with D. Fudenberg)
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information" [01/01/94] (with D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin)
"Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium" [01/01/93] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium" [01/01/93] (with D. Fudenberg)
"An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information" [01/01/91] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player" [01/01/89] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players" [01/01/88] (with D. Fudenberg)
"On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements" [01/01/88] (with D. Fudenberg and D. Kreps)
"Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities" [01/01/87] (with D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole)
"Limit Games and Limit Equilibria" [01/01/86] (with D. Fudenberg)
"Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information" [01/01/85] (with D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole)
"Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games" [01/01/83] (with D. Fudenberg)
